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In Zoographies, Matthew Calarco offers an insightful analysis of anthropocentric
trends in recent Continental philosophers Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Giorgio
Agamben, and Jacques Derrida, combined with provocative suggestions for advancing
beyond the Western tradition’s humanistic dead-end thinking on interspecies ethics.
An introductory essay situates animal questions within Continental philosophy. It
grounds Calarco’s argument within the lineage of possibilities opened by Heidegger’s
critique of modern metaphysical humanism and Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of an
essentialist, reductionist “human-animal” binary, and it presents two main theses: that the
Continental tradition is pervasively and detrimentally anthropocentric and that the
human-animal distinction can and should be abandoned to clear the way for more
genuine encounters with other animal species and promote their more appropriate
philosophical and political treatment. He contextualizes his argument with references to
prominent pro-animal philosophical trends, distinguishing his approach from that of some
types of “identity politics,” by which progressive agendas are divided and vitiated, and
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from those approaches that rely too heavily on a notion of subjectivity that has
problematic blind spots and metaphysical baggage. Unlike Levinas, Slavoj Žižek, and
Alain Badiou, who attempt to rethink subjectivity in the wake of Heideggerian and
Derridean critiques, Calarco declares his suspicion with ethical and political structures
erected on this basis, most of which remain problematically anthropocentric.
The first chapter charts the ways Heidegger distinguishes between human beings
and other animal species, from his distinction between animal perishing and human death
in Being and Time to that between linguistically capable humans and non-linguistic
animals in the “Letter on Humanism,” paying particular attention to a 1929-30 lecture
course in which Heidegger designates non-human animals as “world-poor” and incapable
of recognizing entities “as such.” After clearly presenting the main points of Heidegger’s
analyses, Calarco begins to question them, looking at, for example, the reductionistic way
Heidegger talks of “the being of the animal” as if “animality” designates a monolithic
structure and not a huge diversity of beings with different kinds of experience, some of
which seem quite phenomenologically rich in ways to which Heidegger fails to attend.
Though he credits Heidegger with undermining traditional human-animal hierarchies and
at least attempting to understand animals on their own terms, Calarco shows that
Heidegger’s priorities remain anthropocentric inasmuch as Heidegger never really
engages animal experience as a primary interest, but always as a means of highlighting
the uniqueness of human experience and the kinds of worldly relationships of which,
allegedly, only humans are capable.
Following the figure of the animal in Heidegger’s later writings, Calarco
questions Heidegger’s placement of Nietzsche and Rilke as final thinkers who merely
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exhausted the possibilities of metaphysical humanism without transcending the basic
framework. He argues, with supporting references to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy
on “becoming-animal,” that Nietzsche and Rilke hold much more promise for posthumanist and post-anthropocentric philosophy than Heidegger recognizes.
The chapter provides both an efficient summary of Heidegger’s thinking and
forceful challenges to it. Calarco describes possible detours around Heideggerian
impasses, beginning to explore what it means to consider non-human animal beings
without deploying a clean conceptual line between human and animal being, either in
traditional metaphysical form or Heideggerian existential reinscriptions.
Subsequent chapters follow suit. The second, dealing with the writings of
Emmanuel Levinas, charts two related anthropocentric gestures in Levinas’s thinking, the
denial that non-human animals can experience themselves as subject to an Other’s ethical
demand and respond altruistically, and the denial that they can truly provoke this kind of
altruistic response in human beings, arguing that the logic of Levinas’s account of ethics
justifies neither claim.
He begins by recounting Levinas’s story about “Bobby,” a stray dog who lived for
a while near a Nazi prison camp in which Levinas was held, who earned from Levinas
the title of “last Kantian in Nazi Germany” for his (sort of) willingness to engage the
prisoners as subjects deserving respect while their human captors had debased them to
the status of inhuman objects. This is the closest Levinas comes to admitting any kind of
non-human ethical agency, and he eventually dismisses Bobby with the conclusion that
the dog is not really Kantian because he “lacked the brain needed to universalize
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maxims.” 1 In contrast, Calarco embraces the possibility that Bobby embodies some
brand of ethical or proto-ethical agency, arguing that whether one explains altruism with
a “selfish gene” theory or interprets it at the individual psychological level, Darwinian
biological continuism and recent cognitive ethology undermine Levinas’s anthropocentric
claims that only humans act altruistically.
Calarco then illustrates Levinas’s claims in Totality and Infinity that the Other
who imposes ethical demands must be human, before presenting Levinas’s maddening
equivocations, when in an interview, he maintains absolute human priority on one hand,
while on the other making limited (“One cannot entirely refuse the face of the animal.”)
and agnostic (“I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called a ‘face.’ I
don’t know if a snake has a face.”) admissions that could allow an interspecies extension
of his ethical framework.
Building upon the idea of agnosticism, Calarco suggests that one might remain
faithful to the basic Levinasian structure in which ethics involves having one’s ego
displaced by an encounter that moves one to responsibility, while remaining open to the
possibility that such an encounter might occur in ways other than those that serve as
Levinas’s main examples; one might, for example, be moved by qualities other than the
Other’s destitution, respond in ways other than giving “with both hands,” and be
provoked by something non-human. Calarco proposes a quasi-Levinasian ethical
agnosticism that refuses final answers to the question of who or what can impose ethical
demands and provides an alternative to the recent – and mistaken – philosophical
obsession with delimiting the criteria of ethical considerability, an activity that, even
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when pursued by those sympathetic to animal concerns, is philosophically and politically
dubious.
Calarco closes the chapter by smartly defending his decision to write a book about
animal ethics at all, responding to the possible objection that the agnosticism he defends
calls for casting a wider net and not limiting the discussion to animals. His impassioned
plea stresses that addressing specific questions about non-human animals is required to
disrupt the tradition’s entrenched and harmful metaphysical anthropocentrism and to stop
the horrors of the modern meat and research machines, and he suggests that his approach
might help resolve certain disciplinary skirmishes between pro-animal thinkers,
environmentalists, ecofeminists, etc.
In the third chapter, Calarco maps the question of the animal through the writings
of Giorgio Agamben. It begins with this author’s early contentions that the Western
philosophical tradition, including Heidegger, remains bound by thinking about the
specificity of human experience and the human-animal relationship only in negative
terms, as when it locates the key moments in the transition from non-linguistic, nonpolitical animals to linguistic and political human beings in a mystical, ineffable Voice
that transcends animality but has not or can not be linguistically articulated.
Calarco then delineates Agamben’s attempts to think of these moments and of this
transition in more positive terms. He explores the difference between the modern
solipsistic and pre-social view of the self and Agamben’s picture of the self as a linguistic
construct. He also considers the contrast between the traditional idea that humans “have
language” while non-human animals do not and Agamben’s view that non-human
animals are fundamentally and totally immersed in language, while humans are
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fundamentally deprived of language, beginning in a pre-linguistic state of infancy,
marked by openness to the specifically human forms of history, culture, and politics that
language eventually confers. Thus, Calarco shows that while Agamben attempts to think
differently about the roots and implications of the essential distinction between
specifically human modes of being and modes shared with non-human animals, his early
work is part of a tradition for which the general need to delineate and separate is
unquestioned. As with Heidegger and Levinas, Calarco suggests that empirical ethology
undermines Agamben’s neat lines of demarcation, and he questions Agamben’s apparent
assumptions that only humans are linguistic and political creatures and that the political
realm only includes humans.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on Agamben’s more recent work to
illustrate Agamben's increasing attention to problems that accompany attempts to cleanly
distinguish the human from the animal. Here, Agamben contends that such delineations
lie at the root of many interhuman political problems insofar as exclusion and oppression
proceed on the back of a human / animal distinction, where certain qualities are identified
as “animal” and then attributed to the marginalized human group to justify their
subordination. Building on this, Calarco draws on Agamben’s idea of the
“anthropological machine” to indicate the structures that must be dismantled on the way
to a more relational ontology and a more inclusive political order.
The final chapter begins with an outline of the importance of animal questions for
Jacques Derrida, starting with a lucid and succinct presentation of how deconstruction
works with the human-animal distinction—a point to which Derrida returned
repeatedly—illuminating how the human-animal binary opposition obscures differences,

6

Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/

pretending to recognize two cleanly and simply differentiated homogenous groups in
what is actually a plethora of different types of being.
Following this presentation of Derrida’s deconstructive critique, Calarco explores
Derrida’s more positive (but not fully articulated or developed) ethical and political
strategies. Inspired by Derrida’s discussion of scientific and horticultural abuses, a
powerful section explores the value of comparing the mind-boggling amounts of violence
practiced in factory farming with the Holocaust, arguing that to deny a priori any
possibility that the two situations should be compared on the grounds that humans
deserve special standing simply by virtue of species membership is to commit an
anthropocentric fallacy that withstands neither scientific nor ethical critique.
The next section analyzes the “proto-ethical” demand that precedes moral
assessments and political policies, presenting the way Derrida reads Jeremy Bentham’s
famous question, “Can they suffer?” to highlight not shared capacity among human and
non-human animals, per the traditional interpretation, but, in line with a Levinasian
dynamic, a shared incapacity and experience of susceptibility to suffering affliction. This
is followed by an analysis of Derrida’s ruminations on an encounter during which his cat
saw him naked to show that the kinds of self-reflection and responsibility that protoethical encounters command is provoked not only by exposure to the other animal’s
suffering, but by revelations of other qualities as well, such as inscrutability or
cognizance.
In contrast with thinkers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, who advocate
extending established humanistic ethical systems to include non-human animals, Calarco
opens the next section by affirming Derrida’s suspicion as to the efficacy of existing
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moral and political frameworks for handling and promoting the kinds of ethical
imperatives at stake in inter-species relationships—these frameworks being tainted by
problematic notions of subjectivity, dubious value hierarchies, and a compulsion for
exclusionary line-drawing. Drawing on Derrida’s idea of “carnophallologocentrism,”
Calarco construes these modern humanist juridical and exclusionary elements as “quasiinvisible constraints” that preclude the kinds of ontological and ethical considerations
that interspecies relationships require, marking a failure of imagination that mistakenly
attempts to extend a system that should be cast aside.
With reference to Derrida’s article “Eating Well,” this section includes a
penetrating analysis of the status of vegetarianism with reference to deconstruction.
Here, Calarco problematizes any good conscience one might hope to achieve by adopting
vegetarianism, emphasizing both the stricter demands of veganism and the fact that any
currently possible human diet in modern industrial society will involve harm to animal
life—a situation requiring not a simple decision that allows complacency, but a
continually vigilant striving for an ideal, the full realization of which is ruled out from the
start.
In the final section of the chapter, Calarco notes that even after Derrida, the
tentacles of anthropocentrism reach broadly through numerous disciplines and
institutions, requiring extensive historical and genealogical analysis. He argues that
while Derrida’s work is helpful for showing that the limit between humanity and
animality is not as sharp or simply drawn as the tradition would like to think, it is limited
by its retention of line drawing (albeit more tentative and complex) and ultimately fails to
decisively challenge the metaphysical anthropocentrism of the Western tradition, offering
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nothing to replace the reductive binary human-animal opposition that Derrida so
thoroughly problematizes. In the forceful closing pages, Calarco outlines an alternative
ontological vision, inspired by Nietzschean and Deleuzean materialism, to rival the
traditional human / animal distinction that Derrida frustratingly refuses to abandon,
driving home the central thesis that the human-animal distinction should be surrendered
for the benefit of other animals.
Calarco’s book has much to offer a broad range of readers. The author has a gift
for explaining complex ideas clearly, so that readers unschooled in these thinkers but
sympathetic to their broader phenomenological, cultural, and ethical trends can follow the
argument; he also explains things concisely, so as not to be tedious for readers who are
more familiar with the material. With unwavering focus, he illuminates the many ways
that anthropocentrism runs, sometimes subtly, through recent Continental philosophy,
and he offers insightful and creative suggestions for modes of thought and practice that
exceed these anthropocentric limitations. Throughout the work, Calarco skillfully
bridges the gaps between Continental and analytic philosophy, situating his points with
reference to prominent lines of utilitarian and rights-based Anglo-American pro-animal
approaches, and between philosophy and other disciplines, supporting his arguments with
biology, cognitive ethology, and the kinds of scientific empirical references that are
sometimes missing in philosophical speculation.
On a critical note, though part of the book’s success is its succinctness, certain
arguments might have been strengthened had Calarco analyzed a few additional texts,
such as certain of Heideggerian lecture courses before Being and Time, where he
describes animal worlds, including that of the snail, in ways that might have further
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illuminated Calarco’s observance that Heidegger’s work becomes increasingly severe in
positing abyssal ruptures between human and non-human animal being. He might also
have considered some of Levinas’s (especially later) work dealing with theology, given
the role of such concerns in fueling Levinas’s humanism. In a related point, while
Calarco’s summaries of basic ideas and terminology in the authors he investigates are
clear and informative, occasionally a term is introduced that might have been well served
with additional explanation and contextualization; for example, “onto-theology” and the
figure of the “event” are introduced in a way that seems to assume an audience familiar
with how these ideas function in the thinkers who use them, but many readers might need
more information to fully absorb the strong points Calarco makes along these lines.
These minor considerations do not undermine the general success of Calarco’s
impressive work but perhaps suggest additional valuable paths to pursue, by which his
compelling arguments might be extended and deepened. In any event, the clearly and
passionately argued Zoographies is a definitive exposition of the anthropocentrism in the
philosophers it discusses. An important addition to the vigorous discussion of animality
taking place in contemporary Continental philosophy, it suggests implications for a range
of disciplines involved in the burgeoning fields that constitute current animal studies.
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